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Abstract: This paper evaluates critically the argument of neo-liberals that 
informal employment is a result of high taxes, public sector corruption and too 
much state interference in the free market and that the consequent solution is to 
reduce taxes, public sector corruption and the regulatory burden via  
minimal state intervention. Comparing International Labour Organization data 
on the cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal employment  
with the variables levels of tax rates, corruption and state intervention  
across 41 developing and transition economies, little support is found for  
the neo-liberal approach. Instead, lower (not higher) levels of informal 
employment are found to be associated with higher levels of regulation and 
state intervention, resulting in a call for more, rather than less, regulation and 
state intervention to protect workers in developing and transition economies. 
The theoretical and policy implications are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
For much of the past century, the dominant view was that informal employment was a 
remnant from a pre-industrial mode of production and steadily disappearing with 
economic development and the advent of modern economies (Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 
1959). During the past few decades, however, there has been growing recognition that 
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informal employment is extensive and even expanding in many global regions (Dana, 
2010; ILO, 2012; Schneider, 2013; Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams, 2007; 
Williams and Round, 2007, 2009). The outcome has been the emergence of new theories 
to explain the prevalence of employment that lacks basic social or legal protections or 
employment benefits (ILO, 2012, 2013). The aim of this paper is to evaluate critically the 
validity of a theory that has begun to gain widespread support, namely the neo-liberal 
perspective which views informal employment direct result from high taxes, public sector 
corruption and too much state interference and consequently calls for reductions in 
taxation and corruption along with de-regulation so as to minimise state interference in 
the market (Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 
2005). To evaluate critically the validity of this neo-liberal policy approach, the intention 
in this paper is to analyse whether the cross-national variations in the extent of informal 
employment across 41 developing and transition countries are correlated with the varying 
level of tax rates, corruption and state intervention across these countries. 
To do this, the first section reviews the neo-liberal theoretical approach along with the 
other competing explanations for the prevalence and expansion of informal employment. 
Finding that although this neo-liberal perspective has become ever more popular, few 
critical evaluations have been undertaken of its validity, the second section then begins to 
fill this gap by out lining a methodology to do so. To evaluate whether the cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment are associated with cross-national 
variations in tax rates, corruption and state interference across 41 developing and 
transition economies, this outlines how International Labour Office data on the level of 
informal employment is compared with World Bank development indicators on tax rates, 
corruption and state intervention. The third section then reports the results regarding the 
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment followed in the fourth 
section by a preliminary analysis of the validity of the neo-liberal explanation. The fifth 
and final section then draws some conclusions regarding the validity of the neo-liberal 
approach and discusses both the implications for theory and policy of the findings. 
Before commencing, however, informal employment needs to be defined. All 
definitions denote such employment in terms of what is absent, lacking or missing 
relative to formal employment (Latouche, 1993; Williams, 2009, 2014), exemplified in 
the adjectives used (e.g., ‘atypical’, ‘cash-in-hand’, ‘hidden’, ‘non-visible’, ‘irregular’, 
‘shadow’, ‘unregulated’, ‘underground’ and ‘undeclared’). Despite this multitude of 
terms, however, a strong consensus exists regarding what is lacking. As the 17th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in 2003 outlined, informal 
employment involves jobs lacking basic social or legal protections or employment 
benefits. Informal employment is thus employment which in law or in practice is not 
covered by national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement 
to certain employment benefits (e.g., notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or 
sick leave) (Hussmanns, 2005; ILO, 2012, 2013). 
2 Explaining the prevalence of informal employment: the neo-liberal 
perspective 
During the 20th century, the predominant assumption was that there would be a natural 
and inevitable expansion of the formal economy and that informal employment was a 
leftover from a pre-modern mode of production and gradually waning (Boeke, 1942; 
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Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). From this modernisation perspective, therefore, the level of 
informal employment would naturally reduce as economies modernise and develop. If 
informal employment is rife in an economy, in consequence, this signals its 
‘backwardness’ and ‘under-development’. 
Over the past few decades, however, it has been recognised that some 60% of the 
global workforce are engaged in informal employment (Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009) and 
that informal employment is therefore extensive, persistent and even expanding relative 
to formal employment in many countries and global regions (Buehn and Schneider, 2012; 
Dana, 2013; Feld and Schneider, 2010; ILO, 2012, 2013; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; 
OECD, 2012; Rodgers and Williams, 2009; Schneider and Williams, 2013). The outcome 
has been to refute the view that there is a natural and inevitable trajectory towards 
modern formal economies and that informal employment is a residue from some  
pre-modern mode of production. Instead, the recognition is that the majority of workers 
globally engage in informal employment and that it is formal rather than informal 
employment which is the minority form of employment relationship. The result has been 
the emergence of new explanations for the ongoing persistence and prevalence of 
informal employment. 
At first, it was a political economy perspective which predominantly replaced the 
modernisation perspective. From this standpoint, informal employment is a central facet 
of de-regulated global capitalism and integral component of the new sub-contracting, 
outsourcing and downsizing practices which provide a channel through which businesses 
can achieve flexible production, profit and cost reduction (Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Sassen, 1996; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013). As such, informal 
employment is seen as a survival practice to which marginalised populations turn out of 
necessity as a last resort when alternative means of livelihood are absent and as 
composed of ‘sweatshop-like’ dependent employment and/or ‘false’ self-employment 
(Ahmad, 2008; Geetz and O’Grady, 2002; Ghezzi, 2010). From a political economy 
perspective, therefore, the prevalence of informal employment in an economy is a 
product of a lack of state intervention to protect workers from poverty and the solution is 
therefore greater regulation and state intervention in work and welfare arrangements. 
This political economy perspective, however, has begun to be challenged over the 
past few decades. This is because it has been increasingly recognised that the majority of 
informal employment is conducted on a self-employed basis and is undertaken out of 
choice rather than necessity (Cross, 2000; Cross and Morales, 2007; ILO, 2002; 
Neuwirth, 2011; Small Business Council, 2004; Snyder, 2004; Venkatesh, 2006; 
Williams, 2006; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014; Williams et al., 2012). The outcome 
of this recognition is the emergence of a neo-liberal explanation that reads informal 
employment to be a result of over-regulation rather than under-regulation (Becker, 2004; 
De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Small Business Council, 
2004). 
For neo-liberal commentators, informal employment is a result of high tax rates, a 
corrupt state system and too much interference in the free market, meaning that workers 
make a rational economic decision to voluntarily exit the formal economy to avoid the 
time, costs and effort of working on a formal basis (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 
2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984; Small Business Council, 
2004). Informal workers are therefore depicted as heroes directly challenging regulations 
imposed by intrusive governments and as voluntarily operating in the informal economy 
in order to cast off the constraints of state over-regulation (e.g., Sauvy, 1984; De Soto, 
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1989) As Nwabuzor (2005, p.126) puts it, ‘informality is a response to burdensome 
controls and an attempt to circumvent them’, or as Becker (2004, p.10) asserts, ‘informal 
work arrangements are a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by 
government bureaucracies’. From this neo-liberal perspective, therefore, the level of 
informal employment is greater in economies with higher taxes, more public sector 
corruption and greater state interference and the consequent policy approach is to reduce 
taxes, tackle public sector corruption, deregulation and minimal state intervention  
(De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Small Business Council, 2004). 
In this neo-liberal approach, therefore, those engaged in informal employment  
are seen as participating in a form of popular protest and as constituting a political 
movement seeking to generate a rational competitive market economy (De Soto, 1989). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that neo-liberals wish to promote informal employment. 
Rather, they seek to eradicate informal employment as much as the political economists 
but wish to do so by reducing taxes, public sector corruption and de-regulation so as to 
liberate the formal economy from the state interference that raise labour costs, prevent 
flexibility and increase the costs of formalisation. By diminishing the regulatory burden 
and state interference, the intention is to erase the distinction between the formal and 
informal economies by enabling all work to be conducted in the manner now termed 
‘informal’, although this will be ‘formal’ because it will not be contravening any rules 
and regulations. 
The neo-liberal policy approach, therefore, is to decrease tax rates, tackle public 
sector corruption and give the market free reign by reducing state interference in work 
and welfare arrangements. Akin to political economists, neo-liberals thus portray the 
economy and welfare state as adversaries. The difference between them is that political 
economists are supportive of the welfare state and depict free market capitalism as 
preventing advancement, whilst neo-liberals are supportive of the free market and view 
state intervention in work and welfare provision as interfering with the ability of the 
market to effectively and efficiently allocate resources. Although debates exist within 
neo-liberalism in relation to the degree to which social protection might be provided (see 
Williams, 2004), such commentators largely construe social protection as negative due to 
its deleterious effects on economic performance. Instead, competitive self-regulatory 
markets are seen as superior allocation mechanisms and government interference in 
allocation processes as producing crowding-out effects, maldistribution and inefficiency 
resulting in economies producing less aggregate wealth than if a laissez-faire approach is 
pursued (Lindbeck, 1981; Okun, 1975). 
To evaluate critically the validity of this neo-liberal perspective, therefore, the 
following hypotheses can be evaluated: 
x taxation hypothesis (H1): informal employment is more prevalent in countries with 
higher tax rates 
x public sector corruption hypothesis (H2): informal employment is more prevalent in 
countries with higher levels of public sector corruption 
x state interference hypothesis (H3): informal employment is more prevalent in 
countries with greater state interference in the workings of the free market. 
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Until now, only one study has evaluated this neo-liberal explanation for the varying 
prevalence of informal employment across countries. Comparing the member states of 
the European Union, this finds no evidence to support the neo-liberal explanation and 
instead displays that there is some evidence to support both the modernisation and 
political economy explanations (Williams, 2013). No studies have so far evaluated the 
validity of this neo-liberal explanation beyond the European context. This paper fills that 
gap by examining the variable prevalence of informal employment across 41 developing 
and transition economies. 
3 Methodology 
To evaluate the validity of the neo-liberal explanation for the variations in the prevalence 
of informal employment across developing and transition economies, firstly, an 
International Labour Organization (ILO) dataset is used to report the cross-national 
variations in the prevalence of informal employment. This uses the same common broad 
definition of informal employment and the same survey methodology in each of the 41 
countries. The Bureau of Statistics of the ILO sends a common questionnaire to all 
statistical offices requesting the completion of detailed tables on statistics regarding the 
prevalence of informal employment. This data is collected using either an ILO 
Department of Statistics questionnaire or existing national labour force or informal sector 
survey data is used (for further details, see ILO, 2012). In all countries, those with more 
than one job are classified by their self-reported main employment and only the  
non-agricultural workforce is surveyed. The result is the production of a cross-nationally 
comparable database on the proportion of the non-agricultural workforce whose main job 
is informal employment. 
To test the three hypotheses that constitute the neo-liberal approach, relevant 
indicators are selected from the World Bank development indicators database for the 
same (or closest) year to the survey conducted of informal employment (World Bank, 
2013). The only non-official indicator here used relates to public sector corruption, taken 
from Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (Transparency 
International, 2013). 
To evaluate the neo-liberal taxation hypothesis (H1), the following World Bank 
(2013) country-level indicators on taxation rates are used: 
x Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of revenue. This includes general sales 
and turnover as well as value added taxes, excise duties on goods, taxes on services, 
taxes on the use of goods or property, taxes on extraction and the production of 
minerals and the profits of fiscal monopolies. 
x Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage of revenue. This covers 
taxes on the actual or presumptive net income of individuals, the profits of 
businesses and capital gains on land, securities and other assets. 
x Taxes on revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP. Revenue covers cash 
receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues (e.g., fines, fees, rent and 
income from property or sales). 
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x Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Tax revenue includes compulsory transfers to 
central government for public purposes including fines and penalties. Most social 
security contributions are excluded. Refunds of wrongly collected tax revenue are 
treated as negative revenue. 
x Total tax rate as percentage of commercial profits. This includes all taxes and 
mandatory contributions payable by organisations after allowable deductions and 
exemptions, as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (e.g., personal income 
tax) or paid to tax authorities (e.g., value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and 
service taxes) are not included. 
The neo-liberal public sector corruption hypothesis (H2), meanwhile, is evaluated using 
the following three country-level indicators on public sector corruption: 
x Transparency international’s corruption perceptions index (CPI), which is a 
composite index of perceptions of public sector corruption from 14 expert opinion 
surveys. It scores nations on a 0–10 scale, with zero indicating high levels and ten 
low levels of perceived public sector corruption (Transparency International, 2013). 
x The percentage of firms making informal payments to public officials 
x The percentage of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials. 
Finally, the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis (H3) is evaluated using the following 
seven World Bank development indicators that compare the administrative burden, level 
of regulation and state intervention across countries: 
x Time required to obtain an operating license. 
x The time required (in days) to start a business. 
x The time spent dealing with tax officials as a share of total management time. 
x The ‘ease of doing business’ ranking of each country in the World Bank doing 
business surveys, which is a proxy indicator of the relative regulatory burden across 
countries 
x Social contributions as a % of revenue. This includes social security contributions by 
employees, employers and self-employed individuals and other contributions whose 
source cannot be determined, as well as actual or imputed contributions to social 
insurance schemes operated by governments. 
x The expense of government as a share of GDP, which covers cash payments for the 
operating activities of the government in terms of providing goods and services. It 
covers compensation of employees (e.g., salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, 
social benefits and expenses such as rent and dividends. 
To analyse the relationship between cross-national variations in the prevalence of 
informal employment and the cross-national variations in the above indicators and given 
the small sample size (i.e., 41 cases) and lack of necessary controls to include in a 
multivariate regression analysis, only bivariate regression analyses can be here 
undertaken. Given the non-parametric nature of the data, Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient (rs) is employed to do this. As will become apparent, nevertheless, some 
meaningful findings are produced regarding the validity of the neo-liberal approach. 
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4 Results 
Analysing the prevalence of informal employment across the 41 developing and 
transition economies for which data is available, the simple unweighted average is that 
the majority (53.9%) of non-agricultural workers are in informal employment as their 
main job. Given that the size of the workforce varies across these countries, this needs to 
be taken into account by producing a weighted average. The finding is that across all  
41 countries, 44.4% of the non-agricultural workforce is in informal employment as their 
main job. Informal employment, therefore, is not some minor remnant. It is a sizeable 
sphere employing a significant proportion of the workforce in these developing and 
transition economies. 
However, the share of the workforce in informal employment varies markedly across 
global regions. Dividing these 41 countries into six global regions using the World Bank 
(2013) classification (see Table 1), the weighted average findings are that 83% of the 
working population are in informal employment as their main job in South Asia, 53% in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 52% in the Middle East and North Africa, 51% in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 44% in East Asia and the Pacific and 27% in Europe and Central 
Asia. The share of the workforce in informal employment as their main job is thus not 
evenly distributed across the globe. 
Table 1 Share of non-agricultural workforce in informal employment, 41 countries 
Country Year 
Global region (World 
Bank classification) 
% of jobs in 
informal 
employment 
% of informal 
employment 
which is self-
employment 
Type of 
economy 
India 2009/10 South Asia 83.6 47.2 Dominantly 
informal 
Mali 2004 Sub-Saharan Africa 81.8 88.1 Dominantly 
informal 
Pakistan 2009/10 South Asia 78.4 53.0 Largely 
informal 
Tanzania 2005/6 Sub-Saharan Africa 76.2 73.2 Largely 
informal 
Bolivia 2006 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
75.1 53.6 Largely 
informal 
Honduras 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
73.9 60.2 Largely 
informal 
Madagascar 2005 Sub-Saharan Africa 73.6 57.7 Largely 
informal 
Indonesia 2009 East Asia and Pacific 72.5 49.2 Largely 
informal 
Paraguay 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
70.7 40.2 Largely 
informal 
Philippines 2008 East Asia and Pacific 70.1 47.2 Largely 
informal 
Peru 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
69.9 59.0 Mostly informal 
Source: Derived from ILO (2012) 
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Table 1 Share of non-agricultural workforce in informal employment, 41 countries 
(continued) 
Country Year 
Global region (World 
Bank classification) 
% of jobs in 
informal 
employment 
% of informal 
employment 
which is self-
employment 
Type of 
economy 
Zambia 2008 Sub-Saharan Africa 69.5 64.7 Mostly informal 
Uganda 2010 Sub-Saharan Africa 69.4 65.2 Mostly informal 
Vietnam 2009 East Asia and Pacific 68.2 59.8 Mostly informal 
El Salvador 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
66.4 57.6 Mostly informal 
Nicaragua 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
65.7 58.4 Mostly informal 
Sri Lanka 2009 South Asia 62.1 49.7 Mostly informal 
Ecuador 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
60.9 47.5 Mostly informal 
Liberia 2010 Sub-Saharan Africa 60.0 82.5 Mostly informal 
Colombia 2010 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
59.6 70.1 Semi-informal 
West Bank 
and Gaza 
2010 Middle East and North 
Africa 
58.5 23.5 Semi-informal 
Mexico 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
53.7 44.6 Semi-informal 
Zimbabwe 2004 Sub-Saharan Africa 51.6 N.A. Semi-informal 
Egypt 2009 Middle East and North 
Africa 
51.2 N.A. Semi-informal 
Argentina 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
49.7 45.7 Semi-formal 
Dominican 
rep 
2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
48.5 57.9 Semi-formal 
Venezuela 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
47.5 65.7 Semi-formal 
Namibia 2008 Sub-Saharan Africa 43.9 26.1 Semi-formal 
Panama 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
43.8 60.3 Semi-formal 
Costa Rica 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
43.8 56.1 Semi-formal 
Thailand 2010 East Asia and Pacific 42.3 N.A. Semi-formal 
Brazil 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
42.2 46.3 Semi-formal 
Uruguay 2009 Latin America and 
Caribbean 
39.8 65.7 Mostly formal 
Lesotho 2008 Sub-Saharan Africa 34.9 10.1 Mostly formal 
South 
Africa 
2010 Sub-Saharan Africa 32.7 35.5 Mostly formal 
Source: Derived from ILO (2012) 
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Table 1 Share of non-agricultural workforce in informal employment, 41 countries 
(continued) 
Country Year 
Global region (World 
Bank classification) 
% of jobs in 
informal 
employment 
% of informal 
employment 
which is self-
employment 
Type of 
economy 
China 2010 East Asia and Pacific 32.6 59.8 Mostly formal 
Turkey 2009 Europe and Central Asia 30.6 N.A. Mostly formal 
Armenia 2009 Europe and Central Asia 19.8 33.1 Dominantly 
formal 
Moldova 2009 Europe and Central Asia 15.9 44.3 Dominantly 
formal 
Macedonia 2010 Europe and Central Asia 12.6 40.0 Dominantly 
formal 
Serbia 2010 Europe and Central Asia 6.1 46.6 Nearly formal 
Source: Derived from ILO (2012) 
There are also marked cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal 
employment. As Table 1 displays, the proportion of the non-agricultural workforce that is 
in informal employment ranges from 83.6% of the non-agricultural workforce in India to 
6.1% in Serbia. As indicated earlier, the growing recognition that much informal 
employment is conducted on a self-employed basis is reflected in Table 1, ranging from 
82.5% in Liberia to 10.1% in Lesotho. The proportion of the non-agricultural workforce 
employed in informal employment, moreover, is significantly correlated with the 
proportion that is self-employed at a 0.01 level. Using Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient (rs) due to the non-parametric nature of the data, the finding is that the greater 
is the prevalence of informal employment, the lower is the proportion of the informal 
workforce in informal self-employment (rs = –.413**). 
Figure 1 Type of economy: by level of informal employment 
Nearly 
formal 
Dominantly 
formal 
Largely 
formal 
Mostly 
formal 
Semi-
formal 
Semi-
informal 
Mostly 
informal 
Largely 
informal 
Dominantly 
informal 
Nearly 
informal 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
To chart the relative importance of informal employment in these developing and 
transition economies, Figure 1 provides a spectrum along which countries can be located 
by the share of the non-agricultural working population whose main job is informal 
employment. As the final column of Table 1 reveals, none of these economies are ‘nearly 
informal’ economies, 5% are ‘dominantly informal’ economies, 20% are ‘largely formal’ 
economies, 22% are ‘mostly informal’ economies, 12% are ‘semi-formal’ economies, 
20% are ‘semi-formal’ economies, 12% ‘mostly formal’ economies, 7% are ‘dominantly 
formal’ economies and 2% nearly formal economies. These developing and transition 
economies, therefore, are largely clustered towards the centre of the continuum but 
skewed towards the informal side of the spectrum. 
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Given these findings concerning the cross-national variations in the proportion of the 
non-agricultural workforce in informal employment, the validity of the neo-liberal 
perspective as an explanation for these cross-national variations is now evaluated. 
5 Analysis: evaluating the neo-liberal policy approach 
To evaluate the neo-liberal explanation for the cross-national variations in the level of 
informal employment, an exploratory analysis of the validity of each neo-liberal 
hypothesis is here conducted. 
5.1 Evaluation of the taxation hypothesis (H1) 
To evaluate the neo-liberal taxation hypothesis that the level of informal employment is 
greater in countries with higher tax rates, five different taxation measures are here used  
to examine the association between cross-national variations in taxation levels and  
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment across these 41 developing 
and transition economies. 
Figure 2 Relationship between informal employment and tax rates on goods and services 
 
Starting with the level of taxes on goods and services as a share of revenue and using 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, the finding is that there is a statistically 
significant relationship at the 0.01 level (rs = –.400**). As Figure 2 displays, this 
association is not in the direction suggested by neo-liberal discourse. As tax rates on 
goods and services rise, the share of the non-agricultural workforce in informal 
employment falls, perhaps displaying how countries with greater social transfers have 
lower levels of informal employment because their populations are less dependent on the 
informal economy as a survival tactic. 
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Figure 3 Relationship between informal employment and revenue as % of GDP 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between informal employment and tax revenue as % of GDP 
 
Is this similarly the case when other measures of taxation are analysed? Although no 
significant association is identified between the level of informal employment and either 
the level of taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a share of revenue (rs = .310) or 
total tax rate (rs = .216), a statistically significant correlation at the 0.01 level is identified 
when the cross-national variations in the revenue (excluding grants) as a share of GDP (rs 
= –.626**) and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (rs = –.637**) are analysed (see 
Figures 3 and 4 respectively). In both cases, the direction of the association is again not in 
the direction suggested by neo-liberal discourse. As the level of revenue as a share of 
GDP rises and also tax revenue as a share of GDP rises, the proportion of the  
non-agricultural workforce in informal employment falls. 
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Consequently, no evidence is found to validate the neo-liberal taxation hypothesis 
that the level of informal employment is greater in countries with higher tax rates and that 
informal employment can therefore be tackled by reducing the level of taxation. Indeed, 
these results in developing and transition economies reinforce the findings in Europe 
which similarly identify no association between cross-national variations in tax rates and 
cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal employment (Vanderseypen et al., 
2013; Williams, 2013). 
5.2 Evaluation of the public sector corruption hypothesis (H2) 
To evaluate the neo-liberal public sector corruption hypothesis which asserts that the 
level of informal employment is greater in countries with higher public sector corruption 
levels, three different measures of such corruption can be analysed. 
Figure 5 Relationship between informal employment and public sector corruption 
 
Examining Transparency International’s perceptions of public sector corruption index, a 
significant association at the 0.01 level is identified between cross-national variations in 
the level of informal employment and levels of public sector corruption (rs = –.564**). 
As Figure 5 reveals, the direction of this relationship is that the greater is the perceived 
level of public sector corruption in a country, the higher is the level of informal 
employment. This, therefore, validates the neo-liberal public sector corruption 
hypothesis. However, this is not the case when two measures of actual public sector 
corruption are examined. When the cross-national variations in the percentage of firms 
who make informal payments to public officials is compared with the cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment, no significant correlation is identified  
(rs = .219). Neither is any statistically significant association identified between  
cross-national variations in the percentage of firms who state that they are expected to 
give gifts in meetings with tax officials and cross-national variations in the level of 
informal employment (rs = .247). Although one composite indicator of perceptions of 
public sector corruption thus provides some evidence to support the neo-liberal public 
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sector corruption hypothesis, more direct indicators that ask businesses about whether 
they have suffered such corruption do not find any significant correlation. 
5.3 Evaluation of the state interference hypothesis (H3) 
To evaluate the state interference hypothesis which asserts that the level of informal 
employment is greater in countries with higher levels of state interference in the workings 
of the free market, various measures of state intervention in work and welfare 
arrangements are here examined. 
Figure 6 Relationship between informal employment and cost of starting-up a business 
 
Comparing the cross-national variations in the level of informal employment and  
cross-national variations in the time required in days to start a business, which signals 
whether there is a burdensome regulatory environment for start-ups, no significant 
association is identified (rs = .088). Neither is a significant correlation identified between 
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment and cross-national 
variations in the time required to obtain an operating license (rs = –.135). However and as 
Figure 6 displays, there is a strong statistically significant association between  
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment and cross-national 
variations in the cost of business start-up procedures, expressed as a percentage of GNI 
per capita (rs = .551**). In countries where the cost of business start-up procedures is 
relatively high, informal employment tends to be more prevalent, thus supporting the 
neo-liberal approach. 
If the cost of business start-ups validates the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis, 
it is important not to extrapolate from this to all forms of state intervention. Examining 
whether state interference in welfare arrangements increases the level of informal 
employment as neo-liberals argue or decreases its size as political economists assert, the 
relationship between cross-national variations in the level of informal employment and 
the level of social contributions as a percentage of revenue can be evaluated. The finding 
is that there is a significant association (rs = –.560**). As Figure 7 displays, the direction  
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of this association is that informal employment is more prevalent in countries which 
spend a smaller proportion of revenue on social contributions. This, therefore, refutes the 
neo-liberal state interference hypothesis and supports the political economy argument that 
greater state intervention to protect citizens from poverty reduces the prevalence of 
informal employment. 
Figure 7 Relationship between informal employment and social contributions 
 
Figure 8 Relationship between informal employment and size of government 
 
This is further reinforced when analysing the association between the expense of 
government as a share of GDP, which is a proxy of the degree to which governments 
intervene in work and welfare arrangements and the level of informal employment. Again 
and as Figure 8 reveals, a statistically significant association is found (rs =  
–.668**). This again refutes the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis. Instead, it 
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provides support for the political economy explanation that bigger government reduces, 
rather than increases, the prevalence of informal employment. 
Figure 9 Relationship between informal employment and share of population living in poverty 
 
Indeed, the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis is further refuted when the  
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment and cross-national 
variations in the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line is 
analysed. As Figure 9 reveals, there is a strong statistically significant relationship at the 
0.01 level (rs = .416**). The greater is the share of the population living below the 
national poverty line, the higher is the level of informal employment. This supports the 
political economy argument that informal employment is more an activity of last resort 
turned to by populations in the absence of alternative sources of livelihood, rather than a 
voluntarily chosen endeavour as asserted by the neo-liberal approach. 
Figure 10 Relationship between informal employment and GNP per capita 
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Indeed, it is not solely support for the political economy perspective which is found. The 
conventional modernisation perspective which argues that the level of informal 
employment is lower in ‘developed’ wealthier economies and higher in ‘less developed’ 
economies is also supported. As Figure 10 displays, a strong statistically significant 
association is identified between cross-national variations in the level of informal 
employment and cross-national variations in GNP per capita (rs = –.560**). The direction 
of this relationship is that the share of the non-agricultural workforce employed in 
informal employment is higher in economies with lower levels of GNP per capita, thus 
supporting the modernisation perspective. 
6 Conclusions 
Reporting ILO data on the cross-national variations in the level of informal employment 
across 41 developing and transition economies, this paper has revealed that 44.4% of 
non-agricultural workers are in informal employment as their main job. This brings 
informal employment out of the shadows. Such workers are not a small segment of the 
workforce of limited importance. Nevertheless, marked cross-national variations exist. To 
explain this, this paper has evaluated critically the neo-liberal approach which views 
countries with higher taxes, corruption and state interference to have higher levels of 
informal employment and therefore advocates tax reductions, tackling corruption and 
minimal state intervention as the required policy approach for tackling informal 
employment. 
Evaluating the validity of this neo-liberal approach in relation to these developing and 
transition economies, the finding is that the prevalence of informal employment does not 
reduce when tax rates are lower (H1) and is only associated with the level of corruption 
(H2) when perceptions of public sector corruption are evaluated, not when actual 
corruption behaviour is analysed. Analysing the association between the cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment and the degree of state interference in 
work and welfare arrangements (H3), beyond the cost of business start-up procedures, 
there is no evidence found that supports the neo-liberal argument that the level of 
informal employment is higher in economies with higher levels of state interference. 
Whichever tenet of the neo-liberal approach is evaluated, in consequence, little evidence 
is found to support the view that higher levels of informal employment are prevalent in 
countries with higher taxes, corruption and state interference and that the solution is 
therefore tax reductions, tackling corruption and pursuing minimal state intervention. 
Nevertheless, support is found for the political economy approach which argues that 
higher levels of informal employment are found in economies with less state intervention 
to protect workers from poverty. Not only has it been shown that cross-national variations 
in the level of informal employment are strongly correlated with the level of poverty, but 
also that higher levels of social protection and bigger government result in lower levels of 
informal employment, doubtless because this diminishes the need for marginalised 
populations to turn to informal employment as a survival practice. This study of the 
cross-national variations in the level of informal employment does not only provide 
support for the political economy approach but also the modernisation perspective since it 
shows that the level of informal employment is lower in more developed modern 
economies as measured by GNP per capita. 
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These findings have implications for both theorising informal employment and 
policy. Beginning with the implications for theory, serious concerns are raised regarding 
whether higher levels of informal employment are due to higher tax rates, corruption and 
state interference. Instead, these findings tentatively support both the modernisation 
explanation which views higher levels of informal employment as associated with 
economic under-development and the political economy explanation which argues  
that higher levels of informal employment results from an under-regulation (not  
over-regulation) of economies and a lack of state intervention to protect workers from 
poverty. Consequently, if cross-national variations in the level of informal employment 
are to be explained, a synthesis of the modernisation and political economy approaches is 
required which explains lower levels of informal employment to be associated with 
economic development, smaller shares of the population in poverty and greater levels of 
social protection. The validity of this new ‘neo-modernisation’ explanation now needs to 
be evaluated in other global regions and when time-series data is analysed for individual 
nations. It might also be useful to explore a wider range of economic and social 
conditions regarding state intervention in and regulation of, work and welfare provision 
(e.g., the quality of state governance, labour market policy interventions to protect 
vulnerable groups, regulations on temporary employment) in order to further develop this 
neo-modernisation perspective in a more nuanced manner regarding what state 
interventions reduce informal employment and which do not. 
The findings of this paper also have implications for policy. Over the past few 
decades, a shift has taken place away from eradicating informal employment and towards 
facilitating its formalisation as it has been recognised that the intention in tackling 
informal employment is to address the growth of the formal economy, decent work, fuller 
employment and increasing tax revenue to support wider societal objectives (Chen, 2012; 
Williams and Lansky, 2013). To achieve this, the vast majority of the policy debate has 
revolved around whether targeted repressive measures and/or targeted incentives are most 
effective at facilitating formalisation (Dibben and Williams, 2012; Eurofound, 2013; Feld 
and Larsen, 2012; OECD, 2012; Williams and Lansky, 2013; Williams and Nadin, 
2012a, 2012b, 2014). This paper, however and in contrast to this conventional policy 
debate, reveals that broader economic and social policy measures are also important. Not 
only has it shown that the overarching modernisation of economies, reducing poverty and 
social protection are all closely associated with the level of informal employment but it 
has also shown that a more nuanced approach needs to be developed towards which 
forms of state intervention in work and welfare reduce informal employment and which 
measures increase it. Tackling informal employment, therefore, seemingly requires not 
only a mix of targeted policy measures but also the introduction of broader economic and 
social policies. Whether this policy implication is confirmed when time-series data is 
examined for individual countries needs to be evaluated in future research. 
In sum, this paper raises questions regarding the validity of the neo-liberal approach 
that advocates tax reductions, tackling corruption, de-regulation and minimal state 
intervention when tackling informal employment. If these results thus stimulate further 
critical evaluation of this neo-liberal approach, then it will have fulfilled one of its 
intentions. If it also leads to a rethinking of whether certain forms of state intervention to 
protect workers from poverty might be the way forward in tackling informal 
employment, then it will have fulfilled all of its objectives. 
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